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THE ACTIVIST BOARD AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE'
Terence J. Gallagher'
I. INTRODUCTION
I am here to present the inside board perspective of this discussion on corporate governance. I have
been with Pfizer, Inc. for over thirty years, and I have been involved with our board of directors in one
capacity or another throughout most of that time. I have seen the whole concept of corporate governance
arise and develop.
Like most companies thirty years ago, we had an inside board. In fact, the accepted norm was to
have an inside board, because the theory was that the inside directors knew the company the best and thus,
they knew how best to plan the direction of the company.' The concept of having outside board members
was really not in vogue at the time.
2
In 1972, our chairman,3 who had pretty good foresight as to the direction of the corporate
* This speech was part of a symposium held at Fordham University School of Law on March 13, 1997 entitled
Reshaping Corporate Governance & Shareholder Activism for the 21 Century.
- Terence Gallagher is Vice President - Corporate Governance at Pfizer, Inc. He earned his B.A. from Manhat-
tan College in 1955, his J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1958, and his L.L.M. from New York University in 1966.
Mr. Gallagher joined Pfizer, Inc. in 1966. He was elected secretary of the corporation in 1983 and in 1992 he was
named Vice President of Corporate Governance. He was formerly chairman of the Corporate Counsel section of the
New York State Bar Association and is presently on the Executive Committee of that section. Mr. Gallagher served
as president of the New York Chapter of the American Society of Corporate Secretaries and as a member of the
National Board of that organization. He has written numerous articles on corporate governance.
I See, e.g., Diana Bilimoria & Sandy Kristin Piderit, Qualifications of Corporate Board Committee Members,
GROUP & ORGANIZATION MGMT., Sept. 1, 1994, at 334 (discussing the role and advantages of having inside directors).
2 See, e.g., Cyrus F. Freidheim, Jr., New World Order in the Boardroom, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, June 1, 1996,
at I (presenting an in-depth discussion of the development of the concept of outside directors from the early 201h
century through today); see also Murray L. Weidenbaum, The Evolving Corporate Board, SociErY, Mar. 1, 1995, at 9
(contrasting 1938, when only half of industrial corporations had a majority of outside directors on their boards with
1992, when the average corporate board had nine outside and three insider directors); see also JAY LOscH & EUZA-
BaE MclvER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: TBm REALITy OF AMERICA'S COR,PORATE BOARs (noting that the percent of com-
panies with a majority of outside directors grew from 50% in 1938 to 83% in 1979).
3 See Graef Crystal, Equality of Outcome Management at Pfizer, PENsIoNs & INVESTMENS, Sept. 19, 1994, at
12 (indicating that Edmund T. Pratt, Jr. was Pfizer's chairman in 1972).
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world and corporate boards, 4 brought Felix Rohatyn5 of Lazard Fr6res on as our first outside direc-
tor. We progressed through the 1970s until we achieved a majority of outside and independent directors.6
Currently, we have twelve directors, eight of whom are truly outside and independent.7 We have a couple
of bankers, including Felix Rohatyn, who have some relationship with the company, and we have only one
inside director, our chairman.' Thus, we have evolved into a truly independent board.
II. THE ROLE OF TilE BOARD
A. Monitor and Counsel Management
With regard to Martin Lipton keynote address, Corporate Governance: Does it Make A Differ-
ence,9 it has been my experience that corporate governance has had an effect on the atmosphere in the
board room. As we moved to an outside and independent board, and as the developments in corporate
4 See Freidheim, supra note 2; see also Arthur M. Louis, Firms Seek Outsiders as Directors, S.F. CH-oN., June
17, 1994, at El (citing a survey which found four outsiders to each insider on the boards of 100 large corporations
compared with two outsiders to each insider five years earlier).
-'See World/Nation Briefs, NawsDAY, July 19, 1997, at A15 (noting that Felix Rohatyn was the Managing
Director at Lazard Fr~res, an investment banking firm); see also Vershbowfor NATO?, FIN. TIMwS, Aug. 28, 1997, at
9 (reporting Felix Rohatyn's confirmation as the U.S. Ambassador to France).
6 See Terence J. Gallagher, A Vice-Presidentfor Corporate Governance?, CoRP. BOARD, May 1995, at 16
(citing excerpts from Pfizer's New Corporate Governance Principles including the policy of the company to maintain
a majority of outside members on the board).
7 PFIZE, INC. 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 63 (1997) (The independent directors are: W. Don Cornwell, Chairman
and ChiefExecutive Officer of the Granite Broadcasting Corporation; Michael S. Brown, M.D., Distinguished Chair
of Biomedical Sciences and Regental Professor at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center; George B.
Harvey, Former Chairman, President, and ChiefExecutive Office ofPitney Bowes Inc.; Constance J. Horner, Guest
Scholar at the Brookings Institution and Former Assistant to the President of the United States; Stanley 0. Ikenberry,
Ph.D., President of the American Council on Education; Harry P. Kamen, Chairman, President, and ChiefExecutive
Officer of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company; M. Anthony Burns, Chairman, President, and Chief Executive
Officer of Ryder Systems, Inc.; and Ruth J. Simmons, Ph.D., President of Smith College. The affiliated directors
are: Thomas G. Labrecque, President, Chief Operating Officer of the Chase Manhattan Corporation and the Chase
Manhattan Bank; Felix Rohatyn, Former Managing Director ofLazard Fr~res & Co. LLC; Jean-Paul Val~s, Ph.D.,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Minerals Technologies Inc.; and William C. Steere, Jr., Chairman of the
Board and Chief Executive Officer of Pfizer).
8 See Who's News, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1991, at B2 (indicating that Pfizer named William C. Steere, Jr. chief
executive officer); see Who's News, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1992, at B8 (indicating that William C. Steere, Jr. would
become the chairman of the board at Pfizer on March 1, 1992).
9 See Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance: Does It Make a Difference, 2 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. TAX L.F. 41
(1997).
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governance outlined here by the various speakers came about, the feeling and the atmosphere in the board
room did change. The board does in fact recognize its responsibility to the shareholders. Marty quoted
from Chancellor Allen's speech" during the part of his discussion which dealt with the monitoring or
policing role of the board of directors over management. In a company that has financial or personality
difficulties, such as those exemplified in the case of W.R. Grace," the monitoring role of the board is in
fact the most important role.' 2 However, in a company that is doing well and has an expanding business,
such as Pfizer, 3 it has been my experience that the board's role as counselor, strategic planning body, and
as a check on management's direction for the company, is the more important role.
B. Maintain a Dynamic Balance
I have described the board's dual function in some of my articles as a "dynamic balance," where the
board's role is part adviser or planner to, and part monitor of, management.'" The balance shifts as the
fortunes of the corporation shift."5 The key here, of course, is knowing when, and how quickly, to make
that shift.'6 When you move from a company that has been doing well and you begin to see some problems
- whether in terms of sales, earnings, personalities, or succession to the CEO position - that is the time
when the board has to move to its monitoring role.'7 However, it is very difficult to pin that down and to
10 Id.
"1 See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Grace's Board Votes Changes Meant to Satisfy Big Investors, N.Y. Tudas, Apr. 7,
1995, at DI; see also Kenneth N. Gilpin, Big Investor Talked, Grace Listened, N.Y. TIavms, Apr. 10, 1995, at DI; For
another example, see Weidenbaum, supra note 2 at 19 (discussing how GM's board sought to forestall the develop-
ment of a crisis situation by replacing the CEO because of poor performance on the part of management's reporting to
them).
2 See John W. Byrd, The Insider Story, AcRoss Tim BoARD, Feb. 1994, at 12 (arguing that independent outside
directors are needed to monitor management in situations of potential conflicts of interest, whereas in most business
decisions vigilant monitoring is not as necessary).
'3 Pizat, supra, note 7, at 2 (1997) (indicating that from 1995 to 1996, Pfizer's net income increased 23% on
net sales growth of 13%. During the same period, Pfizer's market capitalization increased 33% to $53.5 billion).
14 Terence J. Gallagher, Corporate Governance: A Dynamic Balance, MEoporrAN CoRP. CoutlsE, Dec.
1996, at 54 (describing how the board's two roles can be adjusted before disaster strikes and drastic action is re-
quired).
1s Id. (noting that if a corporation is doing well and management is doing a competent job, the counseling role
should be emphasized, but if the board detects problems in the business or in management, then the monitoring role
should be emphasized).
16 Id. (indicating that the board has to recognize when it should move from its counseling to its monitoring role
or vice-versa).
'7 See id
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judge whether the board is moving quickly enough to change its role in the corporation.
I think that this "dynamic balance" is something boards are striving for, and that is where the
influence of the institutional investors has had an effect." The board is certainly much more sensitive, and
in the discussions and meetings that I attend, I see the board acting in a way that is responsive to, and aware
of, the climate of the institutional investor and expectations of how things are to be done by boards today.
With respect to Marty's point that boards may have overbalanced in favor of protecting sharehold-
ers and not taking risks in the business,' 9 I am not sure that I would go so far as to say that this has
happened at Pfizer. I think we have hit a pretty good balance of what boards should do in terms of being
responsive to the institutional shareholders. If there are companies with an overbalance in favor of the
shareholders and not taking the business judgment risks that are expected of management or of boards, I
have not seen them. Mr. Lipton may have a point that an overbalance is beginning to happen,"0 but I have
not seen it in the companies that I am aware of, and certainly not in my own company.
C. Take a Proactive Approach
One of the things that has happened over the years at Pfizer, as we moved to an outside board, is the
development of our activities in corporate governance. Pfizer has always been a regulated company, in
terms of its pharmaceutical products, and as a regulated company, we have learned to be proactive in
trying to affect the environment in which we operate - whether that be legislation, regulation, or what have
you. Thus, it became natural for us to be proactive in trying to affect the development and regulation of
corporate governance.
We noted early on that there was not much in the way of academic work being done from the
corporation's point of view. Most of the writing was in terms of the individual or institutional sharehold-
ers. So we have taken on as part of our responsibility to support work being done in the area of corporate
governance. For example, Pfizer sponsored a series of lectures by Michael Novak.2' Each lecture dis-
i See Gilpin, supra note 11 (discussing the effect that institutional investors have had on W.R. Grace & Co.
and the relations between the company and institutional investors).
,9 Lipton, supra note 9.
2Id.
21 Michael Novak, ON CoRPoRATE GOVmANcE: Tim CoRPoRAnoN As IT Ou-mr To BE 45 (1997) (Michael
Novak is the George Frederick Jewett Chair in Religion, Philosophy and Public Policy as well as the Director of
Social and Political Studies at the American Enterprise Institute).
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cussed three different subjects: corporations in general,22 intellectual property,23 and corporate governance.24
We have sponsored some other seminars. We have supported writing by Margaret Blair at the Brookings
Institution," who has been writing some books in the area of corporate governance. 26 Finally, Marty
mentioned the GM Corporate Guidelines or Corporate Principles. 27 Of course, we have our Corporate
Governance Principles, 28 which are in fact similar to the GM Principles.29 There are some differences
because we felt a little bit differently about some things.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. ShareholderActivism
We came to be active in corporate governance in response to the developments that the other speak-
ers have outlined through the 1970s and 1980s.10 We saw this trend developing. We saw the hostility
between companies and their institutional shareholders.
3
'
2 Michael Novak, Tim FtrruaE OF TIM CoaPoA-noN 26 (1996) (challenging corporations to acquire a greater
degree of philosophical and public policy self-consciousness by taking a central role as the chief alternative to gov-
emnment).
2 Michael Novak, THE FIn OF INvimoN, TiE FUEL OF ImmNREsr ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 29-30 (1996)
(acknowledging that patent protection enhances the common good by stimulating useful inventions and creative
works from which the public benefits).
21 Michael Novak, supra note 22, at 31-32 (challenging corporations to contribute to the success of democracy
by animating civil society and helping the poor rise up from poverty).
2 Brookings Institute (visited June 29, 1997) <http://www.brook.edu>. (he Brookings Institution, an inde-
pendent, nonprofit research organization, provides funding for academics and publishes scholarly works that analyze
and make suggestions for improving the performance or effectiveness of American institutions, government pro-
grams, and U.S. public policy).
2 See, e.g., MargaretM. Blair, OWNEasiM AND COmROL: REnIINKING COm'ORATE GovERNANcE FOR THE TwarY-
FiRsT CENTuRY (1995) (arguing that corporations should not focus on maximizing value solely for the shareholders,
but rather maximize the total wealth they create for all of the parties with a stake in the firm); see also TiE DEAL
DECADE: WHAT TAKEovERs ANlD LEvERAGEO BuYouTs MEAN FOR COu'ORArE GOvERNANCE (Margaret M. Blair ed.,
Brookings Press 1993) (illustrating how the corporate restructurings from the past decade shed light on the corporate
governance controversies and boardroom shakeups of today).
2 Lipton, supra note 9; see also James E. Heard, Instituional Investors: Agents of Change, 2 FoPiHAm FiN.
SEC. TAx L.F. 19, 20-21 (1997).
18 See Gallagher, supra note 6 (to request a copy of Pfizer's Corporate Governance Principles, write to: Pfizer,
Inc., 235 East 4211 Street, New York, NY 10017-5755, attn.: Terence Gallagher).
291d (to request a copy of GM's Corporate Governance Guidelines, call: (313) 556-2044).30 Lipton, supra note 9.
31 See Gilpin, supra note 11 (discussing the hostility between W.R. Grace & Co. and its institutional sharehold-
ers).
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Since sixty-four percent of Pfizer is owned by institutions, we are in that category of companies
where the institutions can combine and get something passed if they want to.32 They can approach man-
agement and have them listen very carefully to their concerns.3 So as institutional shareholders became
more active in corporate governance throughout the 1980s,"4 we wanted to be responsive to this develop-
ment. And since we wanted to be involved with our institutional investors, we acknowledged that they
were in fact our owners and opened up a dialogue with them.
For example, one of the things Mr. Lipton had talked about was the poison pill," and we, like most
companies,3 6 have a poison pill. Pfizer's poison pill is coming up for renewal later this year, and we have
been considering whether it should be renewed. When one of our institutional shareholders brought a
shareholder proposal to have us redeem our poison pill, we told them that we would look into and work on
what should be done about it. We even invited them to come and meet with our Corporate Governance
Committee,37 which is considering the issue.
If we do decide to renew our poison pill, we want to be responsive to the institutions and we want
our decision to reflect the independence of our board of directors. Our Corporate Governance Committee,
which is entirely made up of outside and independent directors, is going to have the authority to look at the
32 See generally Dennis J. Block and Jonathan M. Hoff, Mergers andAcquisitions: Corporate Governance and
InstitutionalActivism, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 1996, at 5 (noting that because institutional investors hold 50% of the stock
in large U.S. public companies, they have a significant influence on the board of directors).
33 Id (discussing the push by big institutional shareholders for changes among the board of directors at W.R.
Grace & Co.).34 See, e.g., James E. Heard, Institutional Investors Are Flexing Their Muscles, LEGAL Timas, Oct. 24, 1983, at
11 (discussing how institutional investors exercised their strength during the 1983 proxy season).
3S BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (6th Ed. 1990). A poison pill is "a defense tactic used by a company that is
a target of an unwanted takeover to make its shares or financial condition less attractive to acquire. For instance, a firm
may issue a new series of preferred shares that give shareholders the right to compel their redemption at a premium
price after a takeover." Id See Poison Pills. To Die For, Tim EcoNoMIST, Feb. 24, 1996, U.S. Ed., at 79 (providing a
general discussion of poison pills); see also Randy Myers, Pretty Poison: Anti-takeover Defenses Regain their Dan-
gerous Allure, CFO: MAGAzINE FOR SENIOR FIN. ExEctmnvEs, Mar. 1996, at 43-46 (discussing "chewable" poison pills,
which have proven to be more palatable to institutional investors by overriding certain provisions when acceptable
bids surface); see also, Lyn Perlmuth, Easy-to-Swallow Poison Pills, INST. INvmoR, June 1996, at 35 (commenting
that poison pills' bad reputation may be mainly a public relations problem, which a company can solve by explaining
its thinking to institutional investors).
3 See, e.g., Randy Myers, supra note 35 (illustrating how Colgate Palmolive, Gillette, International Paper and
McDonald's, among others, have renewed their poison pills).
37 Pnzn, supra, note 7, at 63 (1997) (indicating that the following are members of the corporate governance
committee: Constance J. Horner, Chair; Michael S. Brown, M.D., and Harry P. Kamen).
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pill every three years or so. They will decide whether or not things have changed, whether or not the
climate is different, whether or not we should continue to have the pill, or whether we should redeem it at
that point.
B. BoardActivism
This approach reflects what we feel should be the direction that the institutions should be going with
respect to companies that have been responsive to them. We want to see institutions place similar levels of
trust and faith in their independent board members when there is some confidence that they are indeed an
independent board of directors.
If the future is going to be one where we are cooperative with our shareholders, which would get rid
of some of the rancor that took place in the 1980's during the takeover period,38 we need to have the trust
of our shareholders. We are going to have them recognize that there is a place for the board. Not only does
the board have to be responsive to them, but it also has to be the counselor and advisor to management.39
And once the shareholders elect a board, they should place their trust in the independence of the board.
Now, if that goes awry, if a company does not have an independent board or if a company has not
gone in that direction, then surely the institutional investors have the clout and the power to react as well
as do something about it.4" But if that is not the case, we would like to see them distinguish companies that
are trying to do the right thing and are trying to act in the best interests of the shareholders generally from
those companies which do not have a responsive board or an effective corporate governance structure.
This distinction is important because we would like the institutional shareholders to refrain from invoking
the same stringent measures on companies with responsive boards that they might invoke on boards who
are not responsive.
We have had an activist board in the sense that it has taken on the things that the institutional
investors felt were important to them, such as the Corporate Governance Principles which were adopted
Is See Gilpin, supra note 11 (discussing the hostility between W.R. Grace & Co. and its institutional sharehold-
ers).
19 See Jonathan L. Johnson, Catherine M. Daily, and Alan E. Ellstrand, Boards of Directors: A Review and
Research, J. Momr., Sept. 1, 1996, at 409 (discussing the academic debate over B cards and reviewing the role of the
Board of Directors and offering suggestions on how they can improve their performance).
I See Gilpin, supra note I I (noting the influence institutional investors can have on a company).
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early on. We knew of the GM Principles because our Chairman at that time was a director of GM,4 and,
in fact, had participated in a benchmarking program at GM before they wrote their Principles.
Beyond that, and in addition to our Corporate Governance Committee, we have restructured our
compensation for our senior managers to reflect the performance of the company.42 I must say, and Mr.
Lipton had made this point too,43 that with the restructuring of our compensation program, our senior
managers now make much more than before because our company has done well. A good percentage of
the compensation of senior managers is related to the company's performance, and we have done pretty
well.
We did away with our pension plan for our directors, which the institutions told us they did not like.
Mainly in that case, I think, the international unions were the leaders in that area.
IV. CONCLUSION
We set up, as I said, a proactive approach to corporate governance in establishing a Corporate
Governance Department, which I head up. The Corporate Governance Department tries to be active with
the institutional investors, the SEC, and the academic community, and tries to position Pfizer as a company
that is responsive to the corporate governance needs of its shareholders.
As we look to the next century, I think that with the kind of approach to corporate governance that
I have outlined in my speech, we should be able to work very closely and very much in harmony with our
institutional shareholders.
Thank you very much.
t See Crystal, supra note 3 (noting that Pfizer Chairman was on the Board of Directors of General Motors
Corp.).
42 See Gallagher, supra note 6 (indicating how Pfizer's executive compensation committee has revised the
executive pay package to consist of a salary, an annual incentive award based on meeting performance criteria, and a
long-term element consisting of stock options and performance-contingent share awards).
43 Lipton, supra note 9.
